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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY 91
Under the present decision the client cannot collude with the
other party litigant for the purpose of defeating the attorney's
rights. An earlier West Virginia case also points this out as an
exception to the general rule that the client has absolute control
over the settlement of the dispute." There it is said, in effect, that
the contract does not amount to an assignment of an interest in the
chose itself, but gives the attorney such an inchoate right therein,
after the suit is brought, as cannot be defeated by collusion and
fraud between the parties.
In -Missouri the doctrine is established that such agreements
may or may not be a violation of public policy, depending on the
circumstances of each case.' These decisions assert the protection
such contracts afford by preventing the perpretation of fraud on
attorneys, and by serving as obstructions to imposition on needy
and ignorant clients by shrewd adversaries. However, where there
is indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney, the Missouri
court intimates that the agreement would be against public policy.8
The dissenting opinion in the present case convincingly points
out the likely result of the rule as adopted by the majority. Merely
declaring the restraint on compromise inoperative without voiding
the other provisions of the contract assesses no penalty on those who
engage in a practice condemned by public policy. Attorneys may
still use this obnoxious device without incurring any risk. At least,
they have nothing to lose by its insertion in the agreement, since the
remaining provisions may be enforced. Can it not, then, be said
that a practice, admittedly against public policy, is permitted!
It is the opinion of the dissent that such provisions should destroy
the entire contract, and the attorney be allowed to recover for
services rendered only on a quantum meruit basis.
V. K. K.
DuR ss BY THIRD PARTY - ECONOMIC Com-PuIsioN APrPrm
BY BENEFICIARY OF DuREss - Av01DANCE OF RELEASE THEREFOR. -
Decedent, infant daughter of P, was mortally injured by an auto-
mobile driven by D, insured. T, an undertaker, refused to release
the body for burial until payment had been made or secured.
Shortly thereafter a settlement was negotiated between decedent's
indigent parents and X, an insurance adjuster, and a written re-
6 Burkhart v. Scott, 69 W. Va. 694, 72 S. E. 784 (1911).
7 Lipscomb v. Adams, 193 Mo. 530, 91 S. W. 1046 (1906) ; Wright v. Kansas
City, etc. By., 141 Mo. App. 518, 126 S. W. 517 (1910); Beagles v. Robertson,
135 Mo. App. 306, 115 S. W. 1042 (1909).
8 Wright v. Kansas City, etc. Ry., Beagles v. Robertson, both sup-ra n. 7.
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lease executed in consideration of $800. X, insurance adjuster,
knew of T's conduct at the time of settlement but did not collude
with T in any way. Later P in a suit under the wrongful death act
sought to avoid the release on the ground of duress. Held, two
judges dissenting, that a written release may be set aside for
duress exercised by a third party with the participation or knowl-
edge of the releasee. Carroll v. Petty.'
A distinction must be made between a situation in which one,
who having exercised duress and thereby having first secured for
himself a benefit, transfers his ill-gotten gains to another, 2 and the
state of facts presented in the instant case, i. e., duress imposed by
one person and the increment thereof flowing directly to a third
person without further intervention by the party imposing the
duress. In dealing with cases falling within this latter category
courts and writers have propounded the general rule that duress
to nullify a contract must be the act of the adverse party or must
be imposed with his knowledge, and taken advantage of by him
for the purpose of obtaining the agreement.' To this broad legal
proposition exceptions4 and variation must be noted." If the bene-
ficiary has given no consideration for the advantage bestowed upon
him, the transaction will be avoided, even though he was not
cognizant of the wrongful conduct of a third party.' If value has
been given, duress inflicted by a stranger to the dealings will not
invalidate the agreement as against an innocent beneficiary ;7 con-
versely, knowledge on the part of the beneficiary generally will serve
as a basis for setting aside the contract, although consideration is
present.8  As another qualification to the general rule, - where
duress has been employed by a third party in behalf of the bene-
12 S. E. (2d) 521 (W. Va. 1939), Fox and Hatcher, JJ., dissenting.
2 The decisive question being whether the transferee is a bona fido pur-
chaserj if so, the transaction will be affirmed, by the modem American rule.
See Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 13 N. E. 596 (1887) for a full discussion
of the point.
3 Travis v. Unkart, 89 N. J. L. 571, 99 Atl. 320, Ann. Cas. 19170 1031
(1916); Fears v. United L. & D. Bank, 172 Ky. 255, 189 S. W. 226 (1916);
1 BL.ACK, REsCIssION & CANCELLATION (1916) § 224; (1917) 13 C. J. § 324.
4 Cobb v. Vaughan, 141 Va. 100, 126 S. E. 77, 43 A. L. R. 177 (1925) holding
that the beneficiary must in some way have been responsible for the act done.
5 Exceptions and variations pointed out by 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937)
§ 1622.
6 Martin v. Evans, 163 Ala. 657, 50 So. 997 (1909); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1622.
7 Smith v. Commercial Bank, 77 Fla. 163, 81 So. 154, 4 A. L. R. 862 and
note (1919); Beals v. Neddo, 2 Fed. 41 (C. C. D. Kan. 1880); Ladew v. Paine,
82 fl1. 221 (1873).
s Gilley v. Denman, 185 Ala. 561, 64 So. 97 (1913); Edmonds v. McCoy,
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ficiary and the exact result intended has been obtained, courts have
annulled contracts arising from such wrongful pressure, irre-
spective of the good faith of the beneficiary.'
In the present case, where the duress was directed toward an
end entirely distinct from the procurement of the release, doubt-
less the result was affected by the peculiar state of facts presented
and by their repellent background. As indicated by the holding,
one placed in a position knowingly to take advantage of a situation
produced by the unconscionable conduct of another proceeds at his
own risk in dealing with the victim. As a matter of fact, any indi-
cation of overreaching on the part of the beneficiary seems to be
treated as economic compulsion - as a veritable financial upper-
hand closed upon one rendered vulnerable thereto by the ante-
cedent duress imposed by a third party.
As an incident to the chief problem of the present chse, our
court, first reaffirming the proposition that fraud may be pleaded
by way of replication for setting aside a release,' holds that
a fortiori duress may be so pleaded.
W. E. N.
INSURANCE - INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE - EXCEPTIONS AS TO
DOUBLE INDEmNITY AN DISABILITY BENEFITS. - More than two
years after issuance of a policy P insurance company sues to
rescind, on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation in the ap-
plication, the provisions for disability benefits and double indem-
nity. D relies on a clause in the policy, which provides that "This
Policy shall be incontestable after two years fr6m its date of issue
except for non-payment of premium and except as to provisions
and conditions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Bene-
fits." Held, that such incontestability clause does not preclude
215 Ky. 119, 284 S. W. 431 (1926); Payson B. & L. Soc. v. Taylor, 87 Utah
302, 48 P. (2d) 894 (1935).
9 Rodes v. Griffith, Rodes & Co., 102 W. Va. 79, 135 S. E. 244 (1926) ; Lip-
man, Wolfe & Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 258 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929);
Talley v. Robinson, 63 Va. 314 (1872), by dicta that-accomplishment of
intended purpose is sine qua non to relief for duress by third party.
The best justification for granting relief against the beneficiary for
duress practiced by a third party duressor, the duressor gaining no apparent
advantage from the dealings, seems to be the fact that both the innocent
parties are put in statuo quo. See Pound, Interests of Personality (1915) 28
HARV. L. REv. 343. Where the duressor has absconded with a part of the
benefits, a different problem arises, as it is impossible to put both innocent
parties in statuo quo.
10 Workman v. Continental Casualty Co., 115 W. Va. 255, 175 S. E. 63 (1934):
Norvell v. anawha & M. Ry., 67 W. Va. 467, 68 S. E. 288, 29 A. L. R. (N. s.)
325 (1910).
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